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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an income tax case. The Idaho State Tax Commission (the "Commission") has

sought to extend its jurisdiction to tax not only the income from a business operating in this state,
but also the gain earned in the sale of the business by its non-resident corporate owner. This
capital gain, earned from many years of operation in many states around the country, is gain
from the sale of an intangible asset - a membership interest in a Virginia limited liability
company (LLC). As such, the gain is taxable in the state in which the taxpayer resides and to
which it reported the gain.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
After an audit of the taxpayer Noell Industries, Inc. ("Noell Industries"), the Commission

staff proposed a deficiency in tax based on the gain Noell Industries realized from the 2010 sale
of its 78.34% interest in an operating company, Blackhawk Products Group Unlimited, LLC
("Blackhawk"). The asserted deficiency was in the amount of $3,431,686, and was based on the
assumption that the gain represented "business income" as defined in LC. §63-3027(a)(l).
Noell Industries filed an administrative appeal of that deficiency determination, arguing that
neither Idaho law nor the U.S. Constitution allowed the taxation of this income and that, in any
event, the staff had erred by not applying a method of apportioning that income to Idaho that
varied the normal "default" method prescribed in LC. 63-3027. In a Decision entered on
November 8, 2017, the Commission affirmed the determination that the gain was business
income but applied an alternate apportionment factor, pursuant to LC. §63-3027(s), to reduce the
tax to $1,140,489.
Noell Industries filed an appeal to the district court pursuant to LC. §63-3049. In its
Complaint, Noell Industries asserted that the gain in question was not business income as defined
by Idaho law, and in any event that the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the U.S.
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Constitution precluded tax on the gain. It also argued that if any of the gain was taxable in
Idaho, the Commission was correct in applying an alternate apportionment method, but the
method it applied was not correct. R., pp. 000008-000009.
In the district court, Noell Industries filed a motion of summary judgment on the issue of
whether the gain on the sale of the Blackhawk LLC interest represented business income and
whether the Constitution prohibited Idaho from taxing it. The Tax Commission then filed its
own motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no genuine issue of fact regarding the
business income or Constitutional issues, and also asserting that the alternate apportionment
method the Commission developed was correct as a matter of law.
In its 23-page Decision entered on February 15, 2019, the district court granted summary
judgment to Noell Industries on its statutory claim that the income did not represent business
income as defined in LC. §63-3027(a)(l). R. p. 000462. The court also concluded that Idaho's
taxation of the gain in question would also be inconsistent with Due Process and Commerce
Clause requirements - that in order to tax income earned outside of Idaho from the sale of an
ownership interest held outside the state, the entity holding that interest must be part of a unitary
business operating partly in Idaho. The district court did not address Noell Industries' argument
that the tax would violate the Due Process Clause prohibitions on taxes where there is an
insufficient connection with the state. See Corrigan v. Testa, 73 N.E.3d 381 (2016); N Carolina

Dep 't of Revenue v. Kaestner Trust, 139 S. Ct. 2213 (June 21, 2019). That constitutional
principle provides an alternate basis for affirming the district court's decision. Given its holding,
it did not need to address the Tax Commission's argument that there was no genuine issue of fact
concerning the validity of its alternative apportionment method. After the Decision, the
Commission filed a timely appeal.
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C.

Statement of Facts.
The pertinent facts of the case are well-stated at pages 2-5 of the district court's Decision.

The Tax Commission never contends that the facts relied on by the district court are inaccurate
and never argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Yet, the facts are not accurately
stated in the Commission's brief, which frequently conflates or confuses the investments of
Noell Industries with the operations of Blackhawk, the business in which Noell Industries held a
78.34% interest. The Commission never argues that the two entities should be collapsed for tax
purposes or that their separate existence should be ignored, but seems to seek the same result in
sub silentio fashion by incorrectly suggesting that one entity is the mirror image of the other.
In 1993, Mike Noell founded Blackhawk Industries, Inc. in Virginia, to develop and sell
tactical and combat gear. Mr. Noell was a former Navy Seal. In 2004, Blackhawk Industries,
Inc. executed a transaction with new investors that led to the creation of Blackhawk Products
Group, LLC, a Virginia limited liability company (hereinafter "Blackhawk"). R., p. 000199.
Blackhawk Industries contributed all of its operating assets to the new company, in exchange for
a 78.34% interest. The investors obtained the remaining 21.66% interests, and the LLC hired
new executives to help operate the business, R., pp. 000202-000204, 000215. Mr. Noell
continued to provide high-level leadership to the business, but with a management team that ran
the day-to-day operations. (R., pp. 000215, 000278.) Blackhawk Industries Inc. was later
renamed Noell Industries, Inc., which from 2004 onward had no operating assets. 1
Where the Tax Commission's briefrefers to "shared executives between businesses," and
"shared operations," see Brief at pp. 5-6, 26-27 (emphasis added), it is important to recognize
that Noell Industries was not a "business" but an investment vehicle, and that it did not have
"operations" that did involve or could involve "sharing." It reported its activities in its federal
1 The Commission's brief refers to Noell Industries, Inc. as Blackhawk Industries, which was its
name, according to the Brief, "at all times relevant to this case." Brief, p. 1, note 1. Appellant
will use the name "Noell Industries" because it is more accurate, because the district court used
that name, and because it avoids confusion.
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tax returns as "Investments," and its products as "investment." R, p. 000127. It had no
employees, R. p. 0068, so the claim that Noell Industries could rely on and share Blackhawk's
human resources department is entirely without merit. See Brief, pp. 6, 26. It satisfied the
corporate formalities, R. p. 000279, and so elected officers and held meetings, but it did not have
an active business which would have needed those officers to perform any operational functions,
and they did not. R., pp. 000068, 000279. Noell Industries did use the same legal and
accounting firms as Blackhawk, as would be expected, but to call these "shared expenses" would
be inaccurate where Noell Industries' needs would be investment-oriented, not operational.2 In
any event, Noell Industries' expenses were so limited as to not even be shown separately on its
tax returns. R., p. 000319 (no expenses listed for salaries, or any other business-related
expenses, on federal tax return). Indeed, as noted by the Commission, most of Noell Industries'
income came from its investment in Blackhawk, so there would be little need for it to incur other
expenses. In contrast, not all of Blackhawk's income was payable to Noell Industries, as there
was a sizable minority interest.
The operations of Blackhawk from 2004 to 2010 were led by a management team of
which Mr. Noell was a part as president of Blackhawk, although he no longer directed the dayto-day operations of the business. R., p. 000278. During that time, Noell Industries' activities
were limited to the passive role of an investor, holding 78.34% of the Blackhawk LLC units and
not conducting an active business itself. R., pp. 000068, 000279. In 2010, it sold that interest
for a gain, which the Tax Commission seeks to tax in this case.
2 There is one reference in the record to "shared" services, where Noell Industries' CPA stated
that Noell Industries and Blackhawk "shared accounting firms and law firms." R., p. 000199.
The use of the term "shared" here was not in the sense that the two companies divided in some
fashion all the time available from these professionals, as is usually the situation where different
businesses within a unitary group use central administrative personnel, central purchasing, and
other services. Instead, the term "shared" in this sense means only that they have something in
common; both entities use the same firm. This was relevant because in his Declaration, the CPA
was able to provide information about his knowledge of both companies, and their relationship
with each other. See Declaration of David Chase, R., p. 000272.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT NOELL INDUSTRIES, INC. - 4
41926.0005.12118776.5

Noell Industries filed tax returns in Idaho and Virginia consistently with the requirements
of partnership taxation as described in this brief. It reported the gain on the sale of the
Blackhawk LLC membership interests to the state of Virginia. R., p. 000226.
II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Whether the district court was correct in granting summary judgment to Noell Industries
on the issue of whether the gain on the sale of Blackhawk LLC units represented business
income under Idaho law. Alternatively, if the basis on which the district court relied was
incorrect, whether the Decision may be affirmed on other grounds, and in particular that Idaho is
barred from taxing the gain by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as articulated in

Corrigan.
III.
ARGUMENT

A.

Introduction and Summary.
As an LLC, Blackhawk's annual income is passed through to its owners/members under

principles of partnership tax law that have been made applicable to LLCs. See LC. § 63-3006A
(LLC classified as a partnership for tax purposes). There is no dispute that part of Blackhawk's
income was earned in Idaho, and represented "business income" of that entity subject to
apportionment. As a 78.34% owner of Blackhawk, Noell Industries was taxable on that income.
This follows the "aggregate" theory of partnership taxation, where owners are taxed on a
partnership's/LLC 's income as if the entity did not have a separate existence. This is the case
even ifthere are no cash distributions to the owner. See Internal Revenue Code,§§ 701, 702,
704. See generally 1 W. McKee, W. Nelson & R. Whitmire, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, 11.01 (4 th ed. 2017).
But the capital gain on the sale of an LLC ownership interest - an intangible asset requires an entirely different analysis. Here, the "entity" theory of partnership law is followed in
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the context of an individual's interests in the partnership, where the partner is recognized as
separate from the partnership entity. Each partner has a tax "basis" for his/her interest in the
partnership, and when that interest is sold, or when the partnership is liquidated, the partner's
gain or loss on the disposition of that interest is not determined by whatever assets the
partnership owned, but by the partner's basis in his or her partnership interest. See I W. McKee,

supra,,~ 1.02[3]; Internal Revenue Code§§ 741-743.
Idaho tax law is generally consistent with the federal taxation of partners and
partnerships. LC. § 63-3002. However, the issues in this case are issues that do not need to be
addressed at the federal level: after determining the income that is taxable to a partner, what
state is entitled to tax that income? The differences between the taxation of a partnership's
income and the partner's gain on the sale of his/her interest are recognized in Idaho law as in the
federal tax code. If the income is "business income," as defined in LC. § 63-3027(a)(l), part of
the income is "apportioned" to Idaho by formulas set forth in other subsections of section 633027. This generally relates to the annual income of the partnership itself, taxed in accordance
with the "aggregate" approach.
If income is "non-business" income, it is "allocated" to a state under a different set of

rules consistent with the "entity" theory. For capital gains such as Noell Industries' gain on the
sale of Blackhawk LLC units, subsection (f) of section 63-3027 provides that all of the income is
allocated to Idaho if the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in this state. However, Noell
Industries' commercial domicile is in Virginia. That subsection also provides that the allocation
to the state of commercial domicile does not apply if the income is considered "business
income," but now the question is whether the income is Noell Industries' business income, not
Blackhawk's. Again, the focus is on the owner's characteristics and the relation of that income
to the owner, consistent with the aggregate approach, not the underlying business.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT NOELL INDUSTRIES, INC. - 6
41926.0005.12118776.5

In determining whether income represents "business income," the courts have relied on
interpretations of the statutory definition of that term and also Due Process and Commerce
Clause principles that overlay the application of the statute. The appendix to this Brief
summarizes the similar principles that are applied in the statutory and constitutional analysis.
When a non-resident corporation owns an interest in a business that operates in the taxing state
and also has other businesses or assets, both sets of principles require an examination of whether
the corporate owner's income from those other businesses or assets can be taxed along with the
income from the business that actually operates in the state. The primary method of conducting
this analysis is to determine whether the activities of the corporate owner are "unitary" with the
underlying business - whether there are operational and functional connections between the two
that might support the taxation of the income of the non-resident corporation.
Noell Industries' complaint in this case alleged, and the facts clearly show, that the gain
on the sale of the Blackhawk LLC units did not meet the definition of "business income" because
those units were held as an investment and because Noell Industries was not operationally or
functionally unitary with or connected to the business operated by Blackhawk. The Tax
Commission's brief attempts to avoid that conclusion by arguing that there are facts that support
such a connection. But there is no actual factual support for those arguments. The record shows
that Noell Industries did not operate a "trade or business" that would support a "business
income" characterization; that it held these Blackhawk LLC units as an investment; and that
there were no operational or functional ties or synergies between the two entities that could
support a finding of unity sufficient to allow taxation on either a statutory or constitutional basis.
An alternate basis for the district court's conclusions, not relied on by the court, is that
under another line of Due Process analysis, there were simply insufficient contacts between
Noell Industries, as owner of the LLC units, and the state ofldaho that would have justified
taxation.
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B.

Standard of Review.

Appeals from an order of summary judgment are reviewed de novo, and this Court's
standard of review is the same standard applied by the trial court. In the Matter of the Estate of
Victoria H Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 467, 432 P .3d 6, 16 (2018); Trotter v. Bank ofNY Mellon,

152 Idaho 842, 845-46, 275 P.3d 857, 860-61 (2012). Summary judgment is proper where there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Rule 56(c). When hearing cross-motions for summary judgment, and when the district
court is to be the finder of fact at trial, the court may enter summary judgment even if the court
can draw conflicting inferences from the presented facts. Riverside Dev. Corp. v. Ritchie, 103
Idaho 515, 518-19, 650 P.2d 657,661 (1982). While the court must still view conflicting
evidence in favor of the non-moving party, the court may draw inferences from the
uncontroverted facts which it deems to be the most probable rather than drawing all inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272
(1991); see Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d
641, 644 (2006).
When a taxpayer appeals a determination made by the Commission by filing a complaint
against it, "the case shall proceed as other civil cases." "Consequently, we will review this case
as an ordinary civil action, and will utilize the administrative determination as merely an
articulation of the position of a party to this civil action." Pratt v. State Tax Comm 'n, 128 Idaho
883, 884, 920 P.2d 400,401 (1996), quoted in Lockheed Martin Corp., supra, 142 Idaho at 793,
134 P .3d at 644.
C.

The "Business Income" Issue on Which the District Court Decided the Case Was
Not an Unpleaded Issue.
1.

The Unitary Business Principle is an Integral Part of the Business Income
Analysis in this Context.

The Tax Commission leads off its Argument with a lengthy and confusing discussion of a
procedural issue. The Commission contends that the district court erred by allowing Noell
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Industries to present an argument in support of its summary judgment motion that was
unpleaded. Allegedly, Noell Industries did not plead that it is not "unitary" with Blackhawk and
so is now barred from making the argument that the absence of unity is a reason why the gain in
question here cannot satisfy the definition of "business income." (Commission Brief, pp. 9-18.)
The Tax Commission's argument fails for many reasons, not the least of which is the
reality that Idaho is a "notice pleading" jurisdiction, where pleadings need to be sufficient to
introduce the issue but need not be so detailed as to require lengthy analysis in the pleading
itself. 3 Noell Industries' pleading was sufficient by whatever standard is applied, but beyond
ignoring the fundamental rules of pleading, the Tax Commission's argument betrays a basic
misunderstanding of the principles underlying taxation of corporate income. The Commission
attempts to construct a narrow framework by which arguments concerning multi-state taxation
must be pleaded and proved. Instead, it has put up a straw man that is easily toppled.
As noted above, under the tax regimes of most states, the state is authorized to tax its
"apportioned" share of "business income." Non-business income is allocated to the state of the
taxpayer's residence. Noell Industries' Complaint asserted that the Tax Commission's Decision
erred in taxing the gain on the sale of Blackhawk LLC units as business income. It went on to
assert that the Blackhawk interests were in fact an investment in an intangible asset, rather than a

3

The Supreme Court has recently spoken on this subject as follows:
Pleadings must be "[c]oncise and [d]irect[,]" and allegations likewise "must be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required." Id 8(d)(l); accord id
8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice."). These rules comport with
Idaho's notice-pleading requirement, which inquires whether a pleading suffices to
put the adverse party "on notice of the claims brought against it." Brown v. City of
Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,807,229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010) (quoting Gibson v. Ada
Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849 (2003)). Notice pleading
does not mandate that a pleading particularly "identify the statutory basis for
relief'; rather, it mandates that the pleading provide "some indication" of the basis
for relief. Id

Hodge v. Waggoner, 164 Idaho 89, 96,425 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2018) (emphasis in original).
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separate business that generates "business income." Complaint, 19, R., pp. 000008-000009. The
issue of whether, in Noell Industries' hands, the Blackhawk LLC units were an investment or a
business asset was clearly presented in the Complaint. Indeed, this is how the Tax
Commission's decision characterized the central issue in the case: was the income from a
passive investment or was it "directly connected to the taxpayer's business activity." Decision,
p. 7, R., p. 000084.
The importance of a direct connection with the taxpayer's business activity derives from
the following definition of "business income" - the income of a non-resident that Idaho may tax:
... income arising from transactions and activity in the regular
course of the taxpayer's trade or business and includes income
from the acquisition, management, or disposition of tangible and
intangible property when such acquisition, management, or
disposition constitutes integral or necessary parts of the taxpayer's
trade or business operations. (Emphasis added.)
LC. §63-3027(a)(l). In Union Pacific Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 136 Idaho 34, 39,
28 P.3d 375, 379-80 (2001), the Court held this definition encompasses both income from
regular business transactions (the "transactional test"), and income from transactions that may be
unusual but are nonetheless closely related to the business the taxpayer conducted in the state
(the "functional test"). This case does not involve income derived from the regular course of
business, and the question is whether the income meets the functional test as being directly
connected to the taxpayer's trade or business.
Noell Industries does not have a trade or business, so the question faced by the district
court is whether Blackhawk's business may be attributed to Noell Industries. This is where the
"unitary" analysis becomes relevant. If Noell Industries is unitary with Blackhawk, the two
entities are effectively treated as sharing, or both operating, the same trade or business. The Tax
Commission's Decision focused on whether the two entities were connected in an "operational"
way. R., pp. 000084-000085. This is another way of expressing the statutory requirement that
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the income in question is must "integral or necessary parts of the taxpayer's trade or business
operation."
The question of whether two businesses are "unitary" is related to the issue of whether
they have "operational" ties. As discussed in greater detail below, the hallmarks of unity are
functional integration, economies of scale, and centralized management between the two entities.
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm 'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425,438 (1980). If there are

such operational ties between two entities, it strengthens the case that they are unitary. See
MeadWestvaco v. Illinois Dep 't of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 30 (2008) (evaluation of shared

operational functions do not substitute for unitary analysis but are relevant to them). However it
is characterized, the district court was forced to address the "unitary" issue because, in this case,
that is the only way the Tax Commission could prevail. It could prevail only if Noell Industries
did have a trade or business of its own, and Noell Industries' business was integral or necessary
to, and unitary with, the business conducted in Idaho.

2.

Case Law and Rules Concerning Unity in the "Business Income" Context.

The Tax Commission's position apparently is that "unity" is so separate from the
"business income" analysis that it is a required element of pleading. That argument is belied by
the case law and by the Commission's own rules. That case law includes a case the Commission
cites frequently in its brief for other purposes - a case in which this Court expressly applied a
unitary analysis in determining the business income question. Albertson's, Inc. v. State, Dep 't of
Revenue, State Tax Comm 'n, 106 Idaho 810, 683 P.2d 846, 850 (1984).

The case law also includes a case that is completely ignored in the Commission's brief
even though it is cited in the administrative Decision and even though it is discussed at length by
the district court. The case is American Smelting & Refining v. Idaho State. Tax Commission, 99
Idaho 924,592 P. 2d 39 (1979), rev'd on other grounds in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Commission, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (cited in the Commission Decision at p. 7). In that case, the
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taxpayer was involved in various aspects of the mining business, and received income from
subsidiaries that were also involved in that business. The taxpayer claimed that the income
received from these subsidiaries was not business income under section 63-3027, and that even if
it was business income, it could not be subject to tax without violating the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. This Court held that some of the income did meet
the definition of business income, but some did not. With respect to the first question, the Court
held that the Constitution did not impose any additional limitations on the state and that the
income could be taxed. That part of the decision was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. 4
In addressing the statutory question, this Court set out the following basic principle:
The state may include as business income only the taxpayer's
income arising from a trade or business conducted in this state and
is not entitled to apportion income arising from a trade or business
having no connection with this state. However, "whether a number
of business operations having common ownership constitute a
single or unitary business or several separate businesses for tax
purposes depends upon whether they are of mutual benefit to one
another and on whether each operation is dependent on or
contributory to others."
99 Idaho at 931, 592 P .2d at 46 (emphasis added; citations omitted). The Court later tied this
statutory analysis of "business income" to the constitutional inquiry of when a state may tax
income from a multi-state business:
We believe that any constitutional limitations upon a state's right
to apportion the intangible income, including dividends, of a
multistate corporation doing business within the state are satisfied
by the Idaho statutory requirement that the acquisition,
management or disposition of the underlying asset must be an
integral or necessary part of the taxpayer's unitary business, a part
of which is conducted in this state.

The Tax Commission argued before the district court that the American Smelting case is no
longer good law because it was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the case was
reversed only with respect to the constitutional issues addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. It
was later cited with approval by the Idaho Supreme Court in a way that would be inconsistent
with the notion that it was not good law. Albertson's, Inc. supra, 106 Idaho at 814, 683 P .2d at
850.
4
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Id at 938, 592 P.2d at 53 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court acknowledged the link between
business income and the unitary business principle.
In general, with respect to investment income, the following analysis in American
Smelting shows how the business income analysis presupposes that a taxpayer such as Noell

Industries has a trade or business with which the particular type of income may or not be
"directly connected" as part of a unitary operation:
... in order for such income to be properly classified as business
income there must be a more direct relationship between the
underlying asset and the taxpayer's trade or business. The
incidental benefits from investments in general, such as enhanced
credit standing and additional revenue, are not, in and of
themselves, sufficient to bring the investment within the class of
property the acquisition, management or disposition of which
constitutes an integral part of the taxpayer's business operations.

Id at 933, 592 P.2d at 48 (emphasis added).
The district court here realized that American Smelting was an important precedent in
fleshing out the issue of whether income is derived from an investment or from an integral part
of the taxpayer's trade or business. Decision, p. 13, R. p. 000474. The district court transitioned
from that issue to the "unitary" question by citing the Tax Commission's own Rule 333. IDAPA
35.01.01.333. Subsection 08 of that Rule makes specific reference to the unitary principle as one
way in which "business income" may exist: "where the issuer of the intangible property
[Blackhawk in this case] and the taxpayer [Noell Industries] are engaged in the same trade or
business, i.e., the same unitary business .... " That was the issue in American Smelting, and it is
an issue here.
Finally, the district court correctly recognized that a finding of unity would be necessary
under the Due Process and Commerce Clause analysis required to address the allegations in
paragraph 11 of the Complaint. R. , p. 000009. See Memorandum Decision, pp. 14-17. Similar
to the statutory analysis, income from a multi-state business may be taxed by a state only where
the operations within the state are unitary with the business sought to be taxed. MeadWestvaco
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v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 30 (2008). In that case, the Court rejected the
idea that mere "operational" ties can be a basis for constitutionally permitted taxation, and held
that a unitary relationship is required. 5
The Tax Commission offers two additional arguments to support its procedural claim.
First, it asserts that the first time Noell presented the "unity" theory was in its motion for
summary judgment; prior to that time, it had accepted the benefits of unitary characterization by
filing annual tax returns in which it reported income from Blackhawk as business income. (Brief,
pp. 12-13.) However, Noell Industries was simply complying with universally applied principles
of reporting annual income in the states in which the income was earned, consistent with the
aggregate approach to partnership and LLC taxation. That result is compelled by the Idaho Code
provisions which require that Sub S corporations, partnerships and LLCs pass-through the results
of operations to their owners in proportion to their percentage of ownership. LC., § 63-3030;
Tax Commission Income Tax Rule 280, IDAPA 35.01.01.280. Those principles are not tied to
unitary taxation at all. If Blackhawk earned passive income from real estate owned in Idaho,
Noell Industries would be required to pay tax on that income regardless of whether the real estate
was a part of a unitary business.
The present case, in contrast, involves the income derived from the sale of an ownership
interest in the entity - taxed (or not) consistent with the entity approach. This distinction
between income flowed-through from the business and income from a sale of the entity interest
was recognized by the district court, and by many others. See Memorandum Decision, pp. 8-9
and authorities cited therein. See also; Corrigan, supra (recognizing important distinction

5 The Court clarified that an asset may be operationally linked to the business of the taxpayer,

and that the income from that asset may be taxed as part of the taxpayer's unitary business. Id. at
29. For instance, a futures contract to ensure supplies of materials may be important to the
operations, and can be considered as part of the unitary business. However, in this case, the
"asset" of Noell Industries is its interest in Blackhawk, and that asset serves no operational
purpose; it is merely held as an investment.
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between operating income passed through to an owner and capital gain on sale of
partnership/LLC interest); Dupee v. Comm 'n of Revenue, 670 N.E. 2d 176 (Mass. 1996) (gain
from sale of S Corporation owning the Boston Celtics not taxable as business income; "The gain
was not the corporation's gain. The gain inured to Dupee outside the S corporation, rather than
passing through BCI to him .... "); Cohen v. Comm 'r of Revenue, 1995 WL 575131 (Mass. App.
Tax Bd. 1995) ("neither the partnerships nor the partners themselves were in the business of
selling interests in partnerships. Accordingly, the gain derived from the appellants' sale of their
partnership interests is not derived from or connected with a Massachusetts trade or business and
therefore not taxable under §5A").
The question in all these cases is whether the income is "business income." Income
earned by Blackhawk and passed through to Noell Industries is partnership/LLC income that
meets all the tests required to be considered business income, because it is Blackhawk' s business
income that is flowed through to Noell Industries. But Noell Industries has consistently argued
that this gain on the sale of its LLC membership units is not business income for all the reasons
explained above.
The Commission's second argument is that the analysis of business income is different
from the inquiries required under the unitary business principle. The Commission devotes five
pages of argument to the construction of an analytical structure that creates distinct and
apparently mutually exclusive categories for (i) business income analysis, (ii) unitary business
analysis, and (iii) the question of whether a taxpayer has nexus in the taxing state. Commission
Brief, pp. 13-18. But as noted above, the Commission's own Rule 333 recognizes that the unitary
business principle is part and parcel of the business income analysis. ID APA 35.01.01 .333. The
Rule acknowledges that the unitary business principle is one way to show that two entities are
part of the same "trade or business" that might generate business income. It adds that the
business income test is also satisfied if the property in question - the Blackhawk LLC units in
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this case - serve an operational function in the taxpayer's "trade or business." In this case, Noell
Industries did not have a trade or business unless its investment activities are collapsed into and
with the business activities of Blackhawk. So the court must return to the unitary business
principle to determine whether such a combined "trade or business" exists.

In summary, it is disingenuous for the Tax Commission to argue that the "unity" issue
was not pleaded, or needed to be specifically pleaded. But even if the pleading rules were not as
permissive as they are, the argument is far off the mark. The issue that was specifically pleaded
was whether the gain on the sale of the Blackhawk LLC units was business income and also
whether it could be taxed in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements. The existence
of "unity" or a "unitary relationship" must arise in connection with both the business income and
the constitutional analysis.

D.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That the Gain was not Business Income.
The Tax Commission asserts that the business income test is satisfied through a simplistic

and incomplete analysis, with unwarranted assumptions, and by misinterpreting, inflating, and
wrongly applying the clear facts. (Commission Brief, pp. 18-22.) The Commission quotes the
relevant statute, LC. § 63-3027(a)(l), but spends little time parsing the key elements of that
definition. Most importantly, it glides over the requirement of the statute that income in question
must have been integral or necessary parts "of the taxpayer's trade or business." The Brief
repeatedly refers to income Noell Industries received from its Blackhawk LLC units as income
from "its business" or "its trade or business." At one point, the Brief does acknowledge that
Noell Industries did not have "significant business operations of its own" (see Brief, p. 35), and
it never points to credible facts that show that there was any "business." Instead, Noell
Industries' sole activity since 2004 was to hold Blackhawk units and other passive investments.
In applying the functional business income test, the Commission suggests that Noell
Industries is a business because it has reported annually its share of Blackhawk LLC income in
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its Idaho tax returns. (Commission Brief, p. 19.) However, investment income is required to be
reported and taxed in Idaho regardless of its character as business income as long as it has an
Idaho source. And the annual income of Blackhawk that was passed through to Noell Industries
was business income in Blackhawk's hands, and so was reported as such by Noell Industries. It
does not make Noell Industries a "business" by reporting business income earned by another
entity that is passed through to it. See Dupee, Cohen, supra.
The Commission next suggests that Blackhawk was "acquired" in 2004, as that term is
used in the functional test of LC.§ 63-3027(a)(l). And it asserts that the entire purpose of
forming Blackhawk was to serve as an arm of Noell Industries' "business," a "business" that
continued after 2004 because Noell Industries received income from it. It then became a
"necessary part of its [Noell Industries'] business." (Commission Brief, p. 20.) By the
Commission's reasoning, a spin-off of operating assets would never be possible, where the
former owner/operator becomes an investor. Yet its own Rules contemplate exactly the situation
involved in this case. Rule 333.03 provides that an asset that has been converted to an
investment purpose loses its character as a business asset. This applies even to assets that were
"integral and necessary" to a trade or business. IDAPA 31.01.01.333. The Rule cautions that
merely placing an integral asset for sale does not convert the asset to an investment purpose, but
in this case the sale of the Blackhawk LLC units occurred six years after the LLC was formed
and after Noell Industries began holding its share of the LLC units as an investment. The
Commission continues to assert that Noell Industries was a "business" after 2004; with that facile
assumption, naturally any income that is received is business income.
The Commission then argues that in addition to having been "acquired" as a business
asset, the Blackhawk LLC units were "managed" as one, again one of the terms used in the
functional test in LC. §63-3027(a)(l). (Commission Brief, pp. 20-22.) Here, the Commission
conflates the roles of Mr. Noell as the owner of Noell Industries with his role as CEO of
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Blackhawk. It asserts that Noell Industries, through Mr. Noell and another corporate officer Mr.
Ferros, "managed Blackhawk LLC indirectly." And it contends these two men were
"contributed by" Noell Industries. (Id. p. 21.) The fallacy of this argument was recognized by
the district court: Noell Industries had no employees or payroll; it was not "loaning" these
executives to Blackhawk. Memorandum Decision, pp. 5, 22. Noell Industries was a shell
company, with no business activities and no need for the executive expertise the Commission
touts for Mr. Ferros at page 21 of its brief.
The Commission's arguments are little more than contentions that the Court should
ignore the separate existence of these entities, and ignore the fact that Mr. Noell can be both a
shareholder in the investment company and have a role in management of the operating
company. The Tax Commission has pointed to no facts suggesting that Mr. Noell operated Noell
Industries for any purpose other than for investment. Instead, the facts show that the separation
of Mr. Noell's capacities of ownership vs. operation had a legitimate purpose: in 2004, new
owners were brought in and now shared in the right to direct the operation of the Blackhawk
LLC business as owners. Although Noell Industries retained majority control, that control was
subject to all the duties and limitations of Virginia law as it relates to limited liability companies.
See Virginia Code,§§ 13.1-1000 et seq. Further, Idaho courts have not been as willing to ignore

the separate existence oflegal entities as the Commission's arguments seem to assume. See
Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc. 156 Idaho 586, 594-97, 329 P.3d 368, 375-

76 (2014) (affirming summary judgment against party seeking to pierce the corporate veil).

E.

The District Court Correctly Concluded that Noell Industries was not Unitary with
Blackhawk.
The balance of the Tax Commission's brief covers the main issue in the case -whether

Noell Industries is "unitary" with Blackhawk such that Blackhawk's operations can be attributed
to Noell Industries' "trade or business" for purposes ofl.C. § 63-3027(a)(l). The Commission's
arguments here are in two parts: first, arguing that the three-factor test set forth in U.S. Supreme
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Court cases is not correct, or sufficient; and second, that whatever test is relevant is not satisfied
by the facts here. In the latter effort, it attempts to portray the facts as supporting functional,
operational and management ties between Blackhawk and Noell Industries, where none in fact
exist.
The Tax Commission's brief discusses three separate tests by which unity may be shown,
two adapted from old California cases and one from the constitutional analysis by the U.S.
Supreme Court. As the American Smelting case shows, the business income analysis is closely
tied to the constitutional tests for determining whether unity exists in a way that allows state
taxation. See also Albertson's, Inc., supra, 106 Idaho at 814-18, 683 P.2d at 850-54 (applying
U.S. Supreme Court cases to both statutory and constitutional analysis). Although this brief will
address all three tests, the three-factor test from Mobil Oil is most relevant, requiring a showing
of functional integration, centralized management, and economies of scale. 6 Since that test is
most commonly applied in the constitutional analysis, it would be irrelevant if the California
cases required a lower threshold for showing a unitary relationship. But in any event, all these
tests are simply different ways to articulate the same basic requirements. See Mole-Richardson
Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd, 220 Cal. App. 3d 889, 899 (Cal. App. 1990) (functional integration not

distinct from California tests; "the analyses employed makes it clear that the determinative
factors are the same as those set forth in ... the earlier California cases of Butler Brothers v.
McColgan" and others; discusses economies of scale as a feature of centralized management).

The correct outcome in this case is as clear under the California tests as with the constitutional
analysis.

That test has been applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in six cases since Mobil Oil: Exxon
Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep 't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Container Corp. ofAm. v. Franchise
Tax Bd, 463 U.S. 159 (1983); F. W Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep 't, 458 U.S. 354,
364 (1982); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); Allied-Signal, Inc.
v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992); and MeadWestvaco v. Illinois Dep 't ofRevenue,
553 U.S. 16 (2008).
6
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1.

The Three-Factor Unitary Business Test is not Satisfied.

The district court applied the factors sufficiently well that all that is necessary here is to
summarize the analysis and respond to the Tax Commission's critique of it. Memorandum
Decision, pp. 21-23. Probably the most important of the three factors is functional integration:
did the two entities function together essentially as one unit? Did they sell the same product, as
in Mobil Oil? Were they able use one entity's operations in one state to assist the other entity in
another? See Mole-Richardson, supra. Were the separate entities part of the same vertical
operation, as in Mobil Oil or Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,
221 (1980)? None of that occurred here. As the district court noted, the only transaction
between Noell Industries and Blackhawk was a lease of certain property at market value. (R., p.
000483.) That lease did not create a "flow of value" from one entity to another that is a common
feature of all these three factors and the key to unitary characterization. See Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 162-163, 178 (1983).
In examining whether there was functional integration, or whether any of the other
factors were present for the three-factor test or the two California tests, it is important to bear in
mind the extremely limited scope of Noell Industries' activity. It existed solely to hold
investments. There was no need for employees, a human relations department, IT, or even a
physical office. As will be seen, the Tax Commission inflates the role of Noell Industries in this
structure so as to portray it as an active member in a pairing of companies that pool their
resources toward a common goal of more efficient operations between two active businesses.
This attempt to create a picture of robust combined operations must be met with the reality that
Noell Industries was a shell, with no employees and no physical assets. If Noell Industries was
really integrated with and necessary to Blackhawk's operations, it would have been necessary to
sell Noell Industries' operations to the new buyer of Blackhawk, yet only the Blackhawk LLC
interests were sold.
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One example of the Tax Commission's desperate re-characterization of these two entities
is with respect to the issue of functional integration. The Tax Commission asserts that Noell
Industries and Blackhawk "transferred between, or pooled among themselves, technical
information, trade secrets, processes and formulas, know how, research, or development."
Commission Brief, p. 31. Although it acknowledges that this intellectual property was
transferred - not shared - six years prior to the sale in question here, it goes on to assert that
there was continued "sharing" because Mr. Noell and Mr. Ferros held "executive staff' roles
with Noell Industries. Id. p. 32. Noell Industries did not have an executive "staff," much less
one that was "responsible for product development." It had corporate officers in order to satisfy
the "corporate formalities." R., p. 000279. There is no support in the record or anywhere else
that Noell Industries shared operational or management duties with Blackhawk.
With respect to the centralized management factor in the unitary business test, the
Commission again focuses on the functions of Mr. Noell and Mr. Ferros in participating in the
management of Blackhawk as an operating business, without linking those roles to their
functions as corporate officers of the passive Noell Industries investment vehicle. (Commission
Brief, pp. 34-35.) The Commission again cites to "shared executive functions" as if the Noell
Industries' investment decisions were the same as Blackhawk's operational ones. In fact, the
only activity shown by the record from the Noell Industries' officers were those associated with
maintaining the formalities of the corporation (Noell Deel., R., p. 000068, and Second Noell
Dec., R., p. 000279), and the sale of the 78.34% interest in Blackhawk.
Centralized management typically allows a "flow of value" between entities where a
single management team controls diverse activities of subsidiaries, and where essential corporate
services needed by all the operations can be provided by that centralized management. See

Exxon, supra, 447 U.S. at 224 (management provided "the coordination of the refining and other
operational functions"). In F W Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department, 458 U.S.
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354 (1982), the Supreme Court held there was no centralized management over subsidiaries even
though the subsidiaries' boards of directors included one or more parent company employees,
there were frequent communications between management of parent and subsidiary, and the
parent required approval of major financial decisions. The Court found that "each subsidiary
operated as a distinct business enterprise at the level of fulltime management." Id at 366. So
too in this case, Blackhawk had a full slate of management personnel who were fully capable of
operating that business. R., pp. 000202-000204, 000278-000279.
The administrative rules the Tax Commission cites support Noell Industries' position
more than the Commission's. (Commission Brief, p. 33.) Centralized management must have
"an ongoing operational role with respect to the business activities," which manifests as
"mandates, consensus building, or an overall operational strategy of the business." Id, citing
Rule 342.02, ID APA 35.01 .01 .342.02. There is no dispute that Noell Industries did not have an
operational role with respect to Blackhawk's activities.
The final prong of the three-factor test is economies of scale. This factor is related to the
other two, since ifthere is functional integration and/or centralized management, there are
probably economics of scale because more than one business operation can typically leverage the
use of the management team or operating assets (such as IT). In Exxon, the Supreme Court
pointed to the advantages of centralized purchasing, 447 U.S at 224, and in Container Corp., the
parent company assisted the subsidiaries "in obtaining used and new equipment and in filling
personnel needs that could not be met locally." 463 U.S. at 179. On the other hand, in F. W
Woolworth and ASARCO, there was little evidence of economies of scale because there was
virtually no centralized purchasing or other cost-saving factors. F. W Woolworth, 458 U.S. at
366; ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 322-25. For Noell Industries and Blackhawk, there were no costreduction synergies available to reduce costs. This was due in part to the fact that they were
involved in separate activities - investment vs. an operating business. Noell Industries had no
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costs it could share with Blackhawk. In addition, there was no additional "scale" that would
have resulted in reduced costs from shared activities. Blackhawk's geographic and product reach
was the same regardless of whether it is considered a distinct business or whether it is combined
with Noell Industries.
In attempting to satisfy this prong of the unitary business test, the Commission again
tortures the facts. It refers to "joint business operations of Blackhawk and Noell Industries" and
"shared administrative functions," including a "full human resources department." (Commission
Brief, p. 35.) As noted earlier, there were no shared administrative functions; Noell Industries
had no employees and no payroll, and a human resources department would not have been
relevant. All that the Commission can point to specifically is that Noell Industries and
Blackhawk had the same accounting firm and legal counsel, but there is no indication there were
any significant cost savings here, if any. The legal or accounting services in advising an
investment company such as Noell Industries would be different from those in performing
services for an operating business. This is not a case where the costs of providing HR, legal,
accounting, IT or other services to two or five or 10 operating divisions are reduced because the
services for any one as them are similar to those of any other.
With respect to all these factors, the Commission's overarching point seems to be that
Noell Industries had no other corporate purpose than to receive income from Blackhawk, and so
ought to be part of it. But it is logical that in making or deciding to retain an investment (which
Noell Industries did in Blackhawk from 2004 and until 2010), an investor would place its money
with a business or industry it knew well. In other words, the history Noell Industries had with
the Blackhawk operation made this a good investment. Noell Industries could have sold its
78.34% interest in Blackhawk in 2004 and invested the cash proceeds somewhere else, but as it
turned out, the decision to retain the Blackhawk investment was a sound one. The Tax
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Commission ignores that investment motivation, and its arguments echo the argument Idaho
made before the Supreme Court in ASARCO:
Idaho's proposal is that corporate purpose should define unitary
business. It argues that intangible income should be considered a
part of a unitary business if the intangible property (the shares of
stock) is "acquired, managed or disposed of for purposes relating
or contributing to the taxpayer's business."
458 U.S. at 326. The Court rejected this position in strong terms:
This definition of unitary business would destroy the concept. The
business of a corporation requires that it earn money to continue
operations and to provide a return on its invested capital.
Consequently all of its operations, including any investment made,
in some sense can be said to be "for purposes related to or
contributing to the [corporation's] business." When pressed to its
logical limit, this conception of the "unitary business" limitation
becomes no limitation at all. When less ambitious interpretations
are employed, the result is simply arbitrary.

Id Although this reasoning is fully applicable to this case, the facts here are even more
compelling than those in ASARCO. At least the parent company in ASARCO had an operating
business to which the subsidiaries in question were allegedly a unitary part. Here, Noell
Industries had no business at all, only an investment in another company.

2.

The California Tests for Unity are not Satisfied in this Case.

The Tax Commission's brief also argues that there are two other tests for determining
whether two businesses are unitary, from two California cases: Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17
Cal.2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 501 (1942), and Edison California Stores v.
McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947). Although counsel is unaware of any case in

which a court has held these tests are satisfied where the Mobil Oil test is not, we will address
each test.
The Butler test has three elements that must be satisfied: the subject business entities are
unitary when they (1) share joint "ownership;" (2) share operations, such as "central purchasing,
advertising, accounting, and management divisions;" and (3) have a "unity of use in its
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centralized executive force and general system of operation." Butler Bros., 17 Cal. 2d at 678, 111
P.2d 334. These factors are very similar to the functional integration, centralized management
and economies of scale already discussed. And as the Commission's brief concedes, the district
court concluded that Blackhawk and Noell Industries did not have shared operations. (Brief, p.
25.) The Commission attempts to show that conclusion was wrong because of the "centralized"
services it pointed to at other portions of its brief, including a "full human resources
department." (Id., p. 26.) However, as noted above, Noell Industries had no "operations" that
needed such services. It had no employees. And it did not "share" legal or accounting services in
an operational sense; it simply used the same law firm and accounting firm for what minor
services an investment firm would require. It did not share executives as the Commission
argues; Mr. Noell and Mr. Ferros simply acted as officers of both companies, with the different
duties that would be required in managing an operating business compared to those of an entity
holding investments.
The application of the Butler factors is best illustrated by comparing this case with the
facts in the Butler case itself, which provides a fact pattern common to unitary business cases.
The taxpayer owned seven wholesale distributing houses, and each enjoyed the benefits of a
central buying division that allowed lower product costs because of greater combined purchasing
power. 17 Cal. 2d at 665, 669. In addition, there were central advertising, accounting, and
management divisions that provided services to each of the warehouses. In applying both
California and constitutional law principles, the court noted that these shared services linked the
various businesses, justifying unitary business treatment.
In Edison California, the court endorsed the Butler factors as still relevant, and added the
following test: "If the operation ... of the business done within the state is dependent upon or
contributes to the operation of the business without the state, the operations are unitary." 30
Cal.2d at 481 The Commission first notes that the Idaho operations of Blackhawk contributed to
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the nationwide operations of Blackhawk, but that fact is irrelevant to the question of the
integration between Blackhawk and Noell Industries. (Brief, p. 28.) The Commission then
focuses on the "contribution" of Noell Industries to the operations of Blackhawk in two ways.
The first is the "contribution" of property and personnel back in 2004 when the Blackhawk LLC
was reconstituted as the operating business. This is not evidence of an ongoing contribution to a
continuing business that was sold six years later. The second is that Noell Industries depended
on Blackhawk for its revenue. But again, this is no different than any other investment: an
investor depends on the underling investment to provide the hoped-for returns. As noted above,
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected such arguments in ASARCO, and it did so again in F W.
Woolworth:

The state court's reasoning would trivialize this due process
limitation by holding it is satisfied if the income in question "adds
to the riches of the corporation .... " Income, from whatever source,
always is a 'business advantage" to a corporation.
458 U.S. at 363, quoting Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 70 (1920).
Again, the facts of the Edison California case are instructive. There, the taxpayer had 15
subsidiaries operating in various states. The St. Louis office provided "[a] central management
division, a central purchasing department, a central distribution department, a central store
operations department, a central advertising department, and various other central administrative
departments." 30 Cal. 2d at 474. The court concluded that there were contributions to and from
and dependency among the various entities, but" ... if there is no such dependency, the business
within the state may be considered to be separate." Id. at 481. In this case, setting aside the fact
that Noell Industries had no business operations, there was no dependency or contributions
between these two companies from 2004 to 2010. Blackhawk did not need to rely on Noell
Industries for anything. For instance, Blackhawk could have obtained the services of Mr. Noell
and Mr. Ferros even if Noell Industries was not a part owner of the business.
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As pointed throughout this brief, the Tax Commission has no actual facts to support its
argument that there is an operational connection here. It asserts repeatedly that there were "joint
business operations," but even in its brief it concedes that Noell Industries "did not have
significant business operations of its own." (Brief, p. 35.) In fact, Noell Industries did not
operate a business at all. Indeed, later in its Brief, the Commission seems to acknowledge that
Noell Industries had no business operations when it argues that Noell Industries had no business
activity separate from Blackhawk's. (Id., p. 40.) When the Commission does attempt to portray
Noell Industries as operating a business that is the mirror image of Blackhawk's, it has pointed to
no facts that it did. The operations it cites - managerial, human resources, intellectual property,
etc. - are all operations conducted at the Blackhawk level.

F.

Noell Met Its Burden of Proof.
The Tax Commission points out that the party seeking to avoid unitary treatment of

business income characterization bears the burden of proof, and Noell Industries certainly
concedes that rule. (Brief, pp. 37.) It met that burden easily, with Declarations showing that
Noell Industries was not a business; that it had no employees; that it had no operating assets; that
it had no income other than from its investments. See R., pp. 000067, 000279.
These facts made this case appropriate for entry of summary judgment. When any party
moves for summary judgment supported by affidavits, the opposing party cannot rest of
speculation or ask the Court to draw inferences unsupported by facts. The court is obliged only
to draw "reasonable inferences" in favor of the non-moving party. H-D Transport v. Pogue, 160
Idaho 428,431, 374 P.3d 591, 594 (2016). Indeed, in a non-jury case such as this, and where
both parties move for summary judgment, the Court can arrive at the most reasonable inferences
from the undisputed facts. Loomis, supra, 119 Idaho at 437, 807 P.2d at 1274. In its Brief, the
Tax Commission never argues that there are genuine issues of material fact, or argues that the
facts as recited and relied on by the district court were incorrect. Instead, it accepts those facts
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and simply argues that, based on those facts, the district court was wrong as a matter oflaw. A
consistent theme of the Commission's brief is the attempt to have the Court draw inferences
from the fact that Noell Industries owned 78.34% of Blackhawk and shared two officers and
directors; thus, ipso facto, there must be an operational connection between the two. But there
are no facts supporting such a connection. The Commission had the ability to identify such facts
through discovery, and in opposing a motion for summary judgment it must come forth with
specific facts that show a genuine issue of fact.
In support of its burden of proof arguments, the Tax Commission cites the Tennessee
case of Blue Bell Creameries, LP v. Roberts, 333 S.W.3d 59 (Tenn. 2011). That case is not
focused on the burden of proof but on unitary issues, with a holding based on facts that are
distinguishable from this case and, and as the district noted, on legal analysis that is faulty.
(Decision, pp. 20-21.) The case involved a three-tiered business structure, with two levels of
corporate owners of an operating ice cream business. A complicated reorganization transaction
resulted in a large capital gain, which the court held to be business income. The court accepted
the taxpayer's position that the corporate owner of the operating entity did not conduct any
separate business. It then recited the tests of unity from cases such as MeadWestvaco (i.e.,
centralized management, functional integration and economies of scale), but because the holding
company had no business operations, it reasoned that "[t]hese tests are ill-suited for assessing
Taxpayer and [the holding company's] relationship because all three tests require a comparison
of the relationship of the separate business entities' business operations." 333 S.W.3d at 71-72.
It held that the businesses were unitary because there was no evidence that the holding company
was a discrete business enterprise.
Thus, although stating that it was necessary to determine whether the businesses were
unitary, and after articulating the tests necessary for that determination, the court arbitrarily
concluded that the two entities were unitary without applying those tests. The court required the

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT NOELL INDUSTRIES, INC. - 28
4 l 926.0005.12118776.5

taxpayer to show the existence of two businesses and then also show they were not unitary. Id
at 72 (taxpayer must show "that Taxpayer and BBC USA are discrete business enterprises"). The
court failed to recognize that an entity can be a discrete enterprise without being a business. The
Tax Commission here incorrectly asserts that, like the taxpayer in Blue Bell, Noell Industries has
relied on the fact that it is not a separate "business entity" from Blackhawk (Brief, p. 39).
Instead, the point is that Noell Industries is not a business at all. The Commission ignores the
fact that the lack of unity may be established either by the fact that the taxpayer's business is
separate from the business from which income is sought to be taxed, or by the fact that the
taxpayer did not have a business at all but instead held its assets as investments.
The fact that Noell Industries is not a business should reinforce the conclusion that its
one-time income from the sale of Blackhawk cannot be taxed in Idaho either under the
Constitution or the relevant statute. Indeed, section 63-3027(a)(l) provides that business income
is produced when assets are sold that are "integral or necessary parts of the taxpayer's trade or
business operations." (Emphasis added.) The focus is on the "trade or business" of the taxpayer,
not its investments.
The Blue Bell case is also factually distinguishable. The Court focused on the "reduced
expenses" that would accompany the reorganization, the elimination of "costly public reporting
requirements," and the removal of one level of federal taxation." 333 S.W.3d at 68-69. In
addition, the gain at issue in Blue Bell was a gain from an internal corporate transaction that
occurred in the year in which the tax was assessed. By contrast, the reorganization that Noell
Industries effected in 2004 was for entirely different reasons, was tax-free, and was six years
before the straightforward sale transaction that occurred when Noell Industries sold its 78.34%
interest in Blackhawk LLC. As noted earlier, that six-year delay is significant in evaluating
whether Noell Industries' interest was converted from an active business operation to a passive
investment. See Tax Commission Income Tax Rule 333.03, IDAPA 35.01.01.333.03.
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Other cases are consistent with this analysis, and with a framework of determining
whether the relationship between the selling investor and the operating entity is that of a unitary
business. In McKesson Water Products Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 23 NJ. Tax 449 (NJ.
Tax Ct. 2007), ajf'd, 974 A.2d 443 (2009), cert. denied, 200 NJ. 506 (2009), the court addressed
a corporate transaction involving the sale of a bottled water subsidiary by a pharmaceutical
company. 7 Although New Jersey had not adopted the specific definition of "business income"
from UDITPA, the court noted that the difference between the state's "operational income"
definition and the UDITP A definition of "business income" was one of terminology, not
substance. Id. at 454. The court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions, as well as New Jersey.
It concluded that the extraordinary nature of the sale involved in that case was not one that

involved property the "acquisition, management, and disposition" of which constitute an integral
part of the taxpayer's trade or business. 8
7 The form of this transaction was a sale of assets of the bottled water subsidiary, but the actual
transaction involved a sale of the stock of the subsidiary with an election to treat the sale as a
sale of assets by the subsidiary under section 338(h)(10) of the Internal Revenue Code.

8 There is a line of cases in which the court examined how to apply the functional test to
liquidations of a business. Those cases are generally based on situations where (i) the subsidiary
or division or group of assets was an operating division or segment of the taxpayer, (ii) the
taxpayer was engaged in an active trade or business, (iii) the assets sold were part of that
business, and (iv) the segment of the business that was sold was unitary with the parent. That
was not the case in McKesson and is not the case here. However, these cases are further support
for Noell's position. Texaco-Cities Serv. Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 695 N.E.2d 481 (Ill. 1998);
Blessing/White, Inc. v. Zehnder, 768 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. App. Ct.), leave to appeal denied, 786
N.E.2d 180 (Ill. 2002); The May Dep 't Stores Co. v. Ind. Dep 't of State Revenue, 749 N.E.2d 651
(Ind. Tax Ct. 2001); Kemppel v. Zaino, 746 N.E.2d 1073 (Ohio 2001); Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 548
S.E.2d 513 (N.C. 2001); ABB C-E Nuclear Power, Inc. v. Director, 215 S.W.3d 85 (Mo. 2007
(en bane)). Cases holding that the functional test is satisfied in the liquidation context include
Glatfelter Pulpwood Co. v. Commonwealth, 19 A.3d 572, 578 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011 ); Harris
Corp. v. Arizona Dep 't of Revenue, 312 P.3d 1143 (Az. App. 2013); and Jim Beam Brands Co. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 882 (Cal. App. 2005). In Glatfelter, the court noted
that an earlier case holding that a business liquidation was not business income was decided
under a statute in which the language of the functional test was that the "acquisition,
management and sale" of the assets must be integral or necessary to the taxpayer's business,
while the statute in Idaho uses the term "acquisition, management or sale." The Pennslyvania
statute was later amended to the "or" version, leading to the different result under Glatfelter,
although that case did not involve the liquidation of an entire business but only the sale of
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In E.I DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Indiana Department of Revenue, 79 N.E.3d 1016,
1021-24 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2017), DuPont's sale of 100% interest in pharmaceutical subsidiary did
not produce business income under a somewhat different statutory definition, and also could not
be taxed constitutionally because the two companies were not unitary. There was no relevant
flow of value; "occasional oversight" and 100% ownership did not constitute centralized
management; and there were no economies of scale. See also First Nat 'l Bank of Manhattan v.
Kansas Dep 't of Revenue, 779 P.2d 457 (Kan. 1989) (taxpayers denied opportunity to file

consolidated return because holding company was not unitary with operating company; holding
company had no employees and no other assets; "The businesses do not comprise a
homogeneous entity but rather are distinct enterprises lacking a centralized executive force and
unity of operations."); Final Agency Decision No. 09 REV 5669, N. Carolina Dep't of Rev.,
Apr. 21, 2011, CCH N. Carolina State Tax Reporter,

,r 202-510 (non-resident taxpayer holding

company of 32.9% interest not taxable on gain on sale as business income); American Smelting,
supra, 99 Idaho at 935-36, 592 P.2d at 50-51 (ASARCO provided a number of management

services to the Lake Asbestos company in which it held a 52.7% ownership interest; it also
provided employees and gave direction and approval on major policy decisions, but because its
asbestos mining activity is "distinct, separate and umelated to ASARCO's general mining and
smelting business," the income from the investment activity was non-business income); Dupee v.
Commissioner of Revenue, supra, 670 N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 1996) (gain from sale of S Corporation

owning the Boston Celtics not taxable as business income; "The gain was not the corporation's
gain. The gain inured to Dupee outside the S corporation, rather than passing through BCI to
")
. .....
h1m

timberland. The distinction was held not be relevant in Jim Beam, where the California statute
contained the "and" term, and it did not appear to be relevant to the analysis in McKesson. The
Oregon Supreme Court touched on but did not decide the liquidation issue in Crystal
Communications v. Department of Revenue, 297 P.3d 1256, 1260-63 (Ore. 2013).
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Another case that warrants emphasis is F W Woolworth Co. v Department of Taxation
and Revenue Dep 't ofNew Mexico, supra, 458 U.S. 354,364 (1982). In that case the record
established a number of close contacts between parent and subsidiary companies that were
owned 100% by the parent. Those contacts included some common directors among the
companies, and"[ d]ecisions about major financial decisions, such as the amount of dividends to
be paid by the subsidiaries and the creation of substantial debt, had to be approved by the
parent." Id. at 368-69. That level of control and the potential to do more were not sufficient to
create unity. Here, although Mr. Noell held roles as both owner of Noell Industries and president
of the operating company, the two roles are entirely distinct, and his decisionmaking authority as
a representative of Noell Industries was tempered and controlled by the duties to minority
owners of Blackhawk, owners who have significant powers to hold majority owners accountable
to take actions in the best interests of the company. There is nothing in the record to show that
Noell Industries acted in any way other than as a passive investor, or that it even engaged in the
types of high-level decisionmaking noted by the Court in F W Woolworth as insufficient to show
centralized management. 9 And even if there were centralized management in this case, there are
no facts showing functional integration or economies of scale in the dealings between Noell
Industries and Blackhawk LLC.
All of these cases are better authority than another case relied on by the Tax Commission,
Albertson's, Inc., supra, 683 P.2d 846. There, a 100% owned subsidiary was held to be unitary
with the Albertson's parent on the following facts: the subsidiary's only asset was a 50% interest
in a business comprised of the grocery stores of Albertson's that were operating under the same
roof as Skagg's drug stores; every decision of the subsidiary was actually made by Albertson's
Industries' federal income tax return states that its "Business Activity" was "Investment,
and the "Product or Service" was also described as "Investment." R., p.000320. This is
consistent with the Declarations on file that Blackhawk LLC was a manager-managed LLC, not
a member-managed LLC. See Second Declaration of Michael M. Noell, R., p. 00278-00279
(Blackhawk managed by a management team).

9 Noell
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employees; and Albertson's employees kept the subsidiaries' books, prepared its tax returns, paid
its officers and directors, and prepared corporate meeting documents. Id. at 848, 853. Noell
Industries did not perform these functions, or any others, for Blackhawk.
Noell Industries has met its burden of proof that it is not unitary with Blackhawk.

G.

Tax Policy and the Prevention of Loopholes Do Not Justify Taxation.
At pages 40-46 of its brief, the Commission invokes considerations of tax policy,

essentially asking the Court to err on the side of taxation. It should be noted that where
ambiguous tax statutes are concerned, the tax policy considerations are exactly the opposite.
Statutes imposing taxes are construed strictly in favor of taxpayers and against the state. See

Canty v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 138 Idaho 178, 182, 59 P.3d 983, 987 (2002); Goodman Oil
Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 136 Idaho 53, 55, 28 P.3d 996,998 (2001). This principle
comes into play if tax statutes are ambiguous, and section 63-3027(a)(l) meets that condition.
The plea to give the benefit of the doubt to taxation and in particular to a finding of unity
between Blackhawk and Noell Industries must also be met with citation to the string of U.S.
Supreme Court cases in which such arguments were rejected. See MeadWestvaco, Allied-Signal,

ASARCO, and F W. Woolworth.
Finally, the Commission argues that affirming the district court would lead to approval of
a loophole, since individual non-residents arguably are taxed on the types of income at issue here
under LC. §63-3026A(3)(a)(vii), while corporations would not be. We must keep in mind that
the income here has been reported in full to the state of Virginia. There has been no suggestion
anywhere that this taxpayer is attempting to avoid state taxation. The question of whether a tax
is fair for individuals is not before this Court, although we note in the next section of this brief
that taxation in this setting should be unconstitutional for all taxpayers. In any event, the fact
that the Idaho statutes provide specifically for taxation of individuals and do not address
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corporations in the same way is an indication that non-resident corporations are not subject to tax
in Idaho on this income.

H.

Taxation of the Income in Question Violates Due Process of Law.
There are two due process arguments involved in this case. The first has been discussed

throughout this brief - that the Due Process clause, in combination with the Commerce Clause,
limits a state's ability to tax the income of multi-state businesses. This principle prevents a state
from taxing a business unless the taxpayer either operates in the state or conducts a business
outside the state that is unitary with another business conducted in the state. See cases cited in
note 6 above.
The second branch of the constitutional arguments is a pure Due Process claim. This
issue was not addressed by the district court, but is a basis for affirmance by this court as an
alternative to the district court's reasoning. See Swafford v. Huntsman Springs, 163 Idaho 209,
409 P.3d 789, 792 (1976) (where an order of a lower court is correct but is based upon an
erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory). The principle involved
here is best illustrated by the case of Corrigan v. Testa, 73 N.E.3d 381 (2016). In that case, Mr.
Corrigan was a 79 .29% owner of an LLC, Mansfield Plumbing. An Ohio statute provided that if
a non-resident investor owned more than 20% of a pass-through entity, any gain on the sale of an
interest in that entity would be apportioned to and taxed in Ohio based on a three-year average of
the entity's business activity (apparently based on payroll, property and sales factors).
It appears that Mr. Corrigan was actively involved in the operation of the Mansfield

Plumbing business in Ohio, and attended meetings and personally engaged in business in Ohio.
However, the Court held that the imposition of tax on Corrigan violated the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution. It pointed to the distinction discussed earlier in this brief,
between the distributive share of the income of a business where the source of that income is
from activities and transactions partly within the taxing state - which a state may tax - from the
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gain on the sale of an interest in the business by a non-resident - which the state may not tax. In
Due Process terms, the state can tax the former activity because it is providing protections and
benefits to the taxpayer that allow the taxpayer to earn income in the state; but "Corrigan's sale
of his interest in Mansfield Plumbing did not avail him of Ohio's protections and benefits in any
direct way." 73 N.E.3d at 390.
Viewed another way and applied to Idaho, Idaho has ample justification to impose a tax
on the share of annual income generated in Idaho, because Idaho is providing the protections and
benefits of roads, police and fire protection, good schools, and the related services that contribute
to a healthy economy and that allow the production of that income by the taxpayer. But Idaho is
providing no services with respect to out-of-state passive ownership of the entity, and is giving
nothing in return for the tax it seeks to impose. See Blangers v. Dep 't of Revenue & Taxation,
114 Idaho 944, 763 P. 2d 1052 (1988) (transitory presence of railroad employees not sufficient to
impose tax consistent with Due Process requirements).
It is useful to point to an analogy involving investments by non-residents in corporate

stock. If Noell Industries owned stock in Idaho-based companies like Albertsons or Idaho
Power, instead of the investment in Blackhawk LLC, and sold that stock at a gain, there is no
question that it would not be taxed on that gain. From a constitutional standpoint, the answer
should be no different if it owns an investment in an LLC that does business in Idaho.
The Corrigan decision was distinguished but upheld in a later Ohio case, T Ryan Legg
Irrevocable Trust v. Testa, 75 N.E.3d 184 (2016). Here the Court allowed taxation of the gain on

S Corporation shares held by a non-resident trust, but only because the grantor of the trust (and
owner of the business) was himself an Ohio resident. IO
10 The Corrigan case was criticized by the author of a treatise on state taxation, but the author
also noted that the case "reaffirms the general rule regarding treatment of a nonresident's income
from the disposition of an interest in a flow-through entity with no business situs in the state."
Hellerstein & Hellerstein, STATE TAXATION,~ 20.08[3], at p. 20-195 (3d ed. 2017). In other
words, Hellerstein notes the traditional view that unless a statute specifically states otherwise, a
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The reasoning of the court in Corrigan is consistent with a recent holding in the U.S.
Supreme Court case in North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kaestner Trust, 139 S. Ct.
2213 (June 21, 2019). In that case, the state attempted to impose an income tax on a trust. The
beneficiaries of the trust resided in North Carolina, but the trust was established in New York,
the trustee was in New York, no assets were located in North Carolina; no distributions were
made to the beneficiaries in the years at issue, and the beneficiaries had no power to compel
distributions. The Court noted that Due Process requires some minimum connection between the
state and the taxpayer from which it can be shown that the state has provided "benefits and
protections" that justify taxation. Id at 2220. It confirmed prior case law that a trust is a legal
entity in this context separate from the beneficiaries it serves, just as the owner of LLC interests
is separate from the business operated by the LLC itself. The Court rejected the state's argument
that the trust and its beneficiaries were "inextricably intertwined," and also that the benefits and
protections to the beneficiaries could be imputed to the trust because they obviated the need for
the trust to make distributions (which would have been taxed). Id at 2224-26.
There are some differences between Kaestner and this case, including the fact that some
ofBlackhawk's annual income is taxable to Noell Industries even though the latter has no
connection with Idaho in a given year. But that is because that annual Blackhawk income is
earned partially in Idaho and is taxed to Noell Industries only because of the pass-through nature
of income from the Blackhawk LLC structure. What is important about Kaestner is its
recognition, like Corrigan, of the entity theory of taxation, and the distinction between the
non-resident's gain on the sale of intangible assets will not be taxable. As discussed earlier,
Idaho does not have a statute that imposes tax on non-resident corporations owning interests in
flow-through entities; Idaho's statute applies only to non-resident individuals and trusts. LC.
§ 63-3026A(3)(vii). As for the author's criticism of the Constitutional analysis, Idaho's case law
supports a careful application of Due Process issues and a restrained approach in extending its
taxing jurisdiction, and suggests it would follow the Ohio analysis rather than Hellerstein's. See
the Blangers case discussed in the text. Hellerstein also criticized the Blangers decision, at
~ 20.05[4](c), p. 20-57, which shows that his views are obviously not aligned with those ofldaho
courts.
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benefits and protections a state offers to an in-state entity and those (or the absence of them) that
are provided to the non-resident owner of the property. The Kaestner case held that income may
not be taxed to a non-resident entity under some theory that the benefits provided by the state to
the in-state resident (the beneficiaries, Mansfield Plumbing, or Blackhawk) can be imputed to the
out-of-state party with an interest in that asset (the trust, Corrigan or Noell Industries).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Noell Industries respectfully requests that the Court
affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED THIS 16th day of September, 2019.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

ByR~ ~ ~
Attorneys for Respondent
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APPENDIX - TAXATION OF MULTI-STATE CORPORATE NON-RESIDENT INCOME
Business Income per§ 63-3027
Income must
be from a
business, not
an investment

t/

AND

Income must satisfy
transactional or
functional test.
Transactional test is
~ t applicable here.
For functional test:

l

Constitutionally permitted taxation
Income must Income must be from
be from a
a business that
business, not operates in the taxing
an invrtment state, or be from
another business that
is unitary with
) business in taxing
AND
state

l

Mustbefrom
transaction where
acquisition,
management or
disposition of asset
constitute "integral or
necessary parts of
taxpayer's trade or
businessl

Key Tests of Unitary:
Functional
integration;
centralized
management;
economies of scale

There must be a
direct relationship
between the
underlying asset and
the taxpayer's trade
or business.
American Smelting,
592P.2dr 48

These factors show
whether there is a
"flow of value"
between two
businesses beyond
income from a passive
investment or discrete
business. Container
Corp. 463 U.S. at 166,
178

Tax Commission Rule
333.03: income must
be derived from
"integral, function al
or operative
component used in
the taxpayer's trade
or business operation,
or materially
contributed to the
production of income
of the trade or
business ... "

l

Related/Jmulations
of unity: (i) two
businesses must have
joint ownership,
shared operations, and
centralized executive
force and system of
operation; or (ii)
operation of in-state
business is dependent
on or contributes to
business outside state
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